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California Forfeiture Statute: A Means
For Curbing Drug-Trafficking?
In recent years, law enforcement efforts have been directed toward
the problem posed by widespread drug-trafficking.' Research studies
indicate that forfeiture of property attendant to a drug-related crime
can be a highly effective means of attacking the problem. 2 Forfeiture
is best defined as the "divestiture [to the sovereign] without compen-
sation of property used in a manner contrary to the laws of the
sovereign. ' The policy behind forfeiture is to remove the tools of
crime from criminals.' Forfeiture also prevents criminals from keep-
ing the fruits of their crimes because property that may be forfeited
includes proceeds traceable to illegal conduct.' The concept of forfeiture
is that when a statute provides for forfeiture of property connected
with the commission of an unlawful act, the forfeiture occurs at the
moment of the illegal use of the property. 6 A conditional right to
the property immediately vests in the Government.7 Title is perfected
when a judicial decree of condemnation is obtained by the
Government.'
Forfeiture statutes may be either civil or criminal. A civil forfeiture
statute is an in rem proceeding, 9 and the property is the defendant.' 0
The focus of the action is on the use of the property, not the motive
of the individual." No conviction of the person who used the prop-
erty illegally is required' 2 because the personal guilt of the individual
1. See Mv-Rs & BRzosiows i, DRUG AGTrrs' GUIDE TO FoR'aEisn-c OF ASSETS 1 (1981)
(analysis of federal drug forfeiture statutes) (available at United States Attorney's Office, Federal
Building, 650 Capitol Mall, Sacramento, California 95814).
2. See id.
3. United States v. Eight (8) Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193, 193 n.1 (C.D.
Cal. 1978).
4. United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV, 462 F. Supp. 1381, 1391 (W.D. Penn.
1979); United States v. Jenison, 484 F. Supp. 747, 753 (D. Rhode Island 1980). Forfeiture
is not a punishment for criminal activity, but rather an exercise of police power to confiscate
property that was instrumental in crime so as to prevent a continuance of criminal activity. Id.
5. See 21 U.S.C. §881(a)(6); CAL. HEA.TH & SAFETY CODE §11470(0.
6. Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir. 1978); Eight Rhodesian Stone
Statues, 449 F. Supp. at 193 n.1.
7. Ivers, 581 F.2d at 1367; Eight Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. at 193 n.l.
8. Ivers, 581 F.2d at 1367; Eight Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. at 193 n.1.
9. Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931).
10. Id.
11. See MYERs & BRzosTOWsKx, supra note 1, at 48-49.
12. U.S. v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 242 (E.D. Cal. 1982). "The distinguishing characteristic
of a criminal forfeiture provision is that, unlike the in rem character of civil forfeiture
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is not at issue.' 3 The standard of proof is the civil standard of prob-
able cause." The Government must show that reasonable grounds were
present to believe the property was connected to illegal activity." The
civil approach is effective because the low standard of proof allows
the Government to prevail more easily in a forfeiture action. Civil
forfeiture, then, is a highly effective tool for curbing the flow of drugs
because property connected with illicit drug-trafficking is forfeited
without imposing a severe burden on the Government. The criminal
also will lose the profit gained from illegal activity. The federal
forfeiture statute provisions for violation of controlled substances law
are an example of the civil in rem procedure.' 6
In addition to the civil procedure, forfeiture may be accomplished
by a criminal forfeiture statute.' A criminal forfeiture statute pro-
vides for forfeiture of property used illegally when the user is con-
victed of the underlying crime.'" The criminal forfeiture statute dif-
fers from the civil statute in several ways. First, the criminal forfeiture
is an in personam procedure, requiring a conviction of the person
who used the property illegally before title is perfected in the
Government.' 9 Unlike the civil procedure, the criminal action focuses
on the motive of the individual, not on the use of the property.2 0
Second, the standard of proof is higher under a criminal forfeiture
statute. The Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
*the personal guilt of the defendant is at issue." Id. See also Various Items of Personal
Property, 282 U.S. at 580-81; MYERs & BRzosTowsKm, supra note 1, at 6-10 (discussion of
differences in nature between civil and criminal forfeiture actions).
13. See Veon, 538 F. Supp. at 242; Various Items of Personal Property, 282 U.S. at 580-81;
MYERs & BRZOSTOWSKI, supra note 1, at 6-10.
14. E.g., U.S. v. One 56-Foot Yacht Named Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1983).
In rejecting the contention that the government must prove probable cause by at least a
preponderance of the evidence, the court stated:
[T]he various levels of burden of proof have no application to the question of
probable cause. That question concerns "only the probability, and not a prima facie
showing, of criminal activity" [citations omitted]. It therefore seems inappropriate
to speak in terms of probable cause being "proven" by one or another of the stan-
dards of proof applicable to proving the facts essential to establish a prima facie case.
Id. See also MYERS & BRZOSTOWSKI, supra note 1, at 6-10.
15. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
16. 21 U.S.C. §881. This statute provides in pertinent part for the forfeiture of controlled
substances; raw materials used to manufacture controlled substances; containers for controlled
substances; conveyances used to transport controlled substances, unless the conveyance is a
common carrier or unlawfully in the possession of a person other than the owner; books, records,
and research used to facilitate the manufacture of controlled substances; and proceeds traceable
to an exchange of controlled substances unless owner does not have knowledge of the illegal
source of the proceeds. Id.
17. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§1961-1968.
18. See MYERS & BRzosTowsri, supra note 1, at 9-10.
19. See Veon, 538 F. Supp. at 242; MYERS & BRzosTOrsi, supra note 1, at 9-10.
20. See Veon, 528 F. Supp. at 242; MYERs & BRzosTowsri, supra note 1, at 9-10.
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the property was connected to criminal activity before obtaining a
successful forfeiture.2 ' The criminal approach is less effective than
civil forfeiture in curbing drug-trafficking because the Government
will not prevail as easily under the criminal statute. The California
drug related forfeiture statute is an example of the criminal in per-
sonam procedure.22
The purpose of this comment is to recommend that the California
statute be changed from a criminal to a civil forfeiture statute. This
end can be accomplished by withdrawing the California statutory re-
quirement of a conviction. As a consequence of the change, the burden
on the Government will be reduced, and forfeitures will be sustained
more easily. The statute then can become a highly effective tool for
curbing drug-trafficking.
This comment will begin with a discussion of the history of
forfeitures generally, which will be followed by a review of the history
of federal and California drug related forfeiture statutes. The history
section will provide the background necessary to understand the pres-
ent law of forfeitures. The applicable federal and California statutes
will be identified. Two reasons for changing the California statute
then will be advanced. First, the present statute does not serve the
purpose for which it was enacted. The statute was designed to curb
the flow of controlled substances. The high standard of proof re-
quired, however, makes the statute ineffective for accomplishing this
goal. Second, the criminal in personam nature of the statute is in-
consistent with the history of forfeitures generally as civil in rem pro-
ceedings, and with the history of California forfeitures, which indicates
that the state traditionally has patterned state forfeiture laws on federal
forfeiture provisions.
The equities of forfeiture concerning the innocent owner also will
be examined. This comment will suggest that the California approach
is preferable to the federal approach. Under the federal statute, an
owner who is innocent of any crime still may forfeit the illegally used
property. California, however, protects innocent owners. By amend-
ing the drug related forfeiture statute to lower the standard of proof,
yet retaining the protection afforded the innocent property owner,
21. See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
22. CAL. HEaT & SAFETY CODE §11470. This statute provides in pertinent part for the
forfeiture of controlled substances; raw materials used to manufacture controlled substances;
containers for controlled substances; books, records, and research used to facilitate the manufac-
ture of controlled substances; boats, airplanes, and vehicles used to transport controlled
substances; and proceeds traceable to an exchange of controlled substances. Id. Before the
forfeiture may be sustained, however, the state must obtain a conviction of the user of the
property. Id.
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California will create a powerful, yet equitable, weapon with which
to attack the problem of drug-trafficking. The recommendation for
this change begins with a discussion of the history of forfeitures.
HISTORY
Forfeiture is an ancient doctrine having roots in the Old Testament,
which states, "When an ox gores a man or woman to death, the
ox must be stoned. Its flesh shall not be eaten, and the owner of
the ox shall not be liable." '2 3 The passage mandated that the ox be
forfeited to God regardless of the guilt or innocence of the owner.
This ancient principle was the basis for the English common-law con-
cept of the deodand, or "gift to God." 24 The concept was redefined
as a "gift to the state" because the crown was viewed as the earthly
representative of the "divine authority to which the corporate com-
munity believed itself to be ultimately responsible." 2 Property that
caused the death of a human being was forfeited to the state.2 6 The
owner's culpability was immaterial. The forfeiture concept, therefore,
developed as revenge against the offending property.27
By 1800 statutory forfeiture existed in England. 2 The statutes set
forth certain situations in which property would be subject to
forfeiture. 29 The proceeding to determine whether the property should
be surrendered was in rem because the action was brought directly
against the property. Prior to 1800, actions were brought as revenge
against the property regardless of the owner's culpability. The statutory
forfeiture laws, however, did consider the owner's culpability." The
statutory in rem action was brought against the owner for illegal or
23. Exodus 21:28 (Jerusalem Bible).
24. Smith, Modern Forfeiture Law and Policy: A Proposal for Reform, 19 WNI. & MARY
L. REv. 661, 661 (1978).
25. See Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures,
Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L. Q. 169, 183 (1973) (in-
depth discussion of the history of forfeitures).
26. Smith, supra note 24, at 661.
27. See 0. W. HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 34-35 (1881).
28. Smith, supra note 24, at 661.
29. See 3 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs 262, 267 (1803).
Lands, tenements, and hereditaments may be forfeited in various degrees and by
various means: 1. By crimes and misdemeanors. 2. By alienation contrary to law.
3. By nonpresentation to a benefice, when forfeiture is denominated a lapse. 4. By
simony. 5. By nonperformance of conditions. 6. By waste. 7. By breach of copyhold
customs. 8. By bankruptcy.
Id. (emphasis in original).
30. See Smith, supra note 24, at 661.
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negligent conduct and as recompense for the wrongs sustained by
another, or by the public generally.3
In addition to the civil forfeiture, which existed at common law,
a second kind of English common-law forfeiture known as criminal
forfeiture also was recognized.32 Contrary to the civil in rem action,
criminal forfeiture was an in personam proceeding in which all the
property of a convicted felon was forfeited to the king. 33 In the
criminal forfeiture action, the litigation focused on the individual rather
than the property. Under English law, then, civil in rem and criminal
in personam forfeitures coexisted.
A slightly different history of federal forfeitures evolved in the
United States. Forfeiture was never a part of American common law;
nevertheless, forfeiture has existed by statute since colonial days.3"
In addition, criminal forfeitures were prohibited in 1790 by the first
Congress of the United States. 35 The prohibition was reexamined and
eliminated in 1970,36 but until then, forfeiture in the United States
was only by civil action.
Forfeiture under federal law currently is considered to be an in rem
proceeding against property that has been used in connection with
some wrong. Statutes that provide for forfeiture of contraband goods,
such as drugs, are designed to rid the community of these items.
37
The belief developed that the illegal property was so repugnant that
the property should be condemned to the state.38 Modern statutes also
provide for the forfeiture of property that is not illegal per se, such
as boats,39 vehicles," and airplanes,4' but that has become objectionable
because the property has been used in connection with illegal activity. 2
A report of the United States House of Representatives4 3 suggests that
the rationale for forfeiture of these items is to deter crime:
Enforcement officers of the Government have found that one of
31. See 3 BAcKSsToNE, ComsnNTAsEs 262, 267 (1803).
32. See MYrts & BRzosTows i, supra note 1, at 301.
33. See id. at 9, 301.
34. See Smith, supra note 24, at 661-62.
35. See 18 U.S.C. §3563; see also MyERs & Bazosrowsri, supra note 1, at 301.
36. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
37. See Smith, supra note 24, at 662.
38. See id.
39. 21 U.S.C. §881(a)(4); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11490.
40. 21 U.S.C. §881(a)(4); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11490.
41. 21 U.S.C. §881(a)(4); CAL. HEALTH & SAETY CODE §11490.
42. Smith, supra note 24, at 662; see also MYEai & BRzosTowsKI, supra note 1, at 75-77.
43. H.R. Rep. No. 2751, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV.
2952, 2952-53.
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the best ways to strike at commercialized crime is through the pocket-
books of the criminals who engage in it. Vessels, vehicles and air-
craft may be termed the operating tools of dope peddlers, and often
represent major capital investments to criminals whose liquid assets,
if any, are frequently not accessible to the Government. Seizure and
forfeiture of these means of transportation provide an effective brake
on the traffic in narcotic drugs."
Although statutory civil forfeiture in England was considered punish-
ment for the owner's culpable conduct,45 the goal of civil forfeiture
in the United States is different. In the United States, the purpose
of civil forfeiture is to confiscate the tools of crime to prevent a con-
tinuance of criminal activity46 and to prevent criminals from keeping
the fruits of their crimes. 7 The civil proceeding in the United States
is independent of, and wholly unaffected by, any criminal proceeding.48
The forfeiture action, however, is based on criminal conduct, which
has led to the classification of civil forfeitures as quasi-criminal.4 9
Despite the quasi-criminal nature, the standard of proof is the lower
probable cause test used in civil actions. A successful forfeiture, then,
is easier for the Government. The purpose of curbing crime, therefore,
is advanced.
The civil action existed as the sole type of forfeiture proceeding
for almost 200 years. In 1970, however, Congress established criminal
forfeiture provisions as part of two federal statutes.5 The two statutes
provide for in personam actions. Forfeiture in those actions is depen-
dent upon an initial conviction of the defendant of a pattern of
criminal activity.5 Under present federal law, then, civil and criminal
forfeitures coexist to make forfeiture applicable to a greater variety
of situations.
The law of federal forfeitures has evolved to encompass civil and
criminal actions that allow the Government to confiscate property used
in illegal activities. Although the forfeiture statutes apply to a wide
variety of crimes, modernly crimes related to controlled substances
44. Id. at 253.
45. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
46. See One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV, 462 F. Supp. at 1391; Jenison, 484 F. Supp. at 753.
47. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
48. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-15 (1827).
49. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1885).
50. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [hereinafter referred to as
RICO], 18 U.S.C. §§1962, 1963; The Controlled Substances Act, Continuing Criminal Enter-
prise Offense, 21 U.S.C. §848.
51. RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§1962, 1963; 21 U.S.C. §848.
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occupy the forefront52 because forfeiture can be an effective means
to curb the flow of drugs.53 California54 and federal55 drug forfeiture
statutes have been enacted to combat the problem of drug-trafficking.
Although similar in language, the statutes are quite different in effect.
DRUG FoRFITURE STATUTES: FEDERAL V. CALIFORNIA
Forfeiture actions are created by statute to curb a wide variety of
crimes. The focus of this section is on the provisions of the federal5 6
and California 57 drug forfeiture statutes, which provide for forfeiture
of property associated with drug-trafficking. A comparison of the
statutes will indicate that the federal approach is more effective in
accomplishing the statutory purpose. An understanding of the provi-
sions of the federal statute, therefore, is necessary.
A. Federal Forfeiture Provisions
A major source for federal forfeiture in drug cases is 21 U.S.C.
section 881, which was enacted in 1970 as part of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act.58 The Act was passed because
Congress recognized a need to deal with the growing menace of drug
abuse in the United States.5 9 The statute does not require a convic-
tion prior to forfeiture;6" therefore, the action is a civil in rem
proceeding. 6' Section 881 sets forth a description of property forfeitable
to the United States when used in violation of the Act. Specifically,
forfeitable property includes: 1) controlled substances;62 2) all materials
used to manufacture controlled substances;63 3) containers; 6 4 4) all
conveyances used to transport controlled substances; 65 5) books,
52. Comment, An Analysis of Federal Drug-Related Civil Forfeiture, 34 ME. L. Rv. 435,
436-37 (1982).
53. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
54. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11470.
55. 21 U.S.C. §881.
56. Id.
57. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11470.
58. 21 U.S.C. §§801-960.
59. H.R. Rep. No. 91-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADiaN. NEWS 4566, 4567; see also Comment, supra note 52, at 438.
60. See 21 U.S.C. §881.
61. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
62. 21 U.S.C. §881(a)(1).
63. Id. §881(a)(2).
64. Id. §881(a)(3).
65. Id. §881(a)(4).
1041
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records, and research; 6 and 6) proceeds traceable to an exchange of
a controlled substance.67
The federal forfeiture action begins with a seizure of the property
by the investigating government agents. 68 This seizure may be made
prior to, concurrent with, or subsequent to the arrest of the
individual. 69 Although seizure may be made without a warrant,"0 the
seizing official must have probable cause to believe that the property
is connected to a violation of the Act.7' This pre-hearing seizure has
been held constitutional. 72
Normally, the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments require that an individual be given notice and an opportunity
to be heard before being deprived of property. 7" When the following
three criteria are satisfied, however, notice and a hearing may be
delayed until after the seizure: 71 1) the seizure serves an important
governmental interest;7" 2) a need for prompt actions exists;7 6 and
3) a responsible government official initiates the seizure under a
carefully worded statute. 77 Forfeiture under section 881 has been
determined to satisfy the criteria. The important governmental interest
is to reduce widespread drug abuse. 8 Prompt action is needed in seizing
the property to prevent transfer to an innocent third party.79 Finally,
specially trained government officers have a duty to ensure that prob-
able cause exists before the seizure is initiated.80 Despite this excep-
tion to the general requirement of a pre-seizure hearing, however,
the owner of the property is not deprived of an opportunity to be
heard. 8' A prompt post-seizure hearing is required.8 2 This post-seizure
hearing is the forfeiture hearing.
At the forfeiture hearing, the Government must demonstrate that
66. Id. §881(a)(5).
67. Id. §881(a)(6).
68. See Comment, supra note 52, at 439.
69. See MYERS & BazoSTOWSKI, supra note 1, at 13; Comment, supra note 52, at 439.
70. See Comment, supra note 52, at 439.
71. Id.; see also MYERS & BRzosTowsKI, supra note 1, at 13.
72. See U.S. v. One 1967 Porsche, 492 F.2d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 1974); Ivers, 581 F.2d at 1368.
73. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972).
74. See MYRSs & BRZOSTOWSKi supra note 1, at 200.
75. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90-91; see also MYms & BRzosrowsm, supra note 1, at 200.
76. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91; see also MYERS & BRzosTowsrm, supra note 1, at 200.
77. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91; see also MYERs & BRZOSTOWSKI, supra note 1, at 200.
78. See MYERs & BPzosTowsmc, supra note 1, at 200-01.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 212.
82. Id.
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the required probable cause for the seizure was present. To meet the
standard of probable cause, the Government must show that reasonable
grounds were present to believe the property was connected to illegal
drugs."3 The grounds for belief may be supported by less than prima
facie evidence but more than mere suspicion.8" Probable cause is a
low standard. The Government should easily meet the requirements.
The quasi-criminal nature of forfeitures, 5 however, makes the exclu-
sionary rule applicable to the proceeding. 6 As a result, evidence ob-
tained in violation of the fourth amendment is inadmissible to establish
the probable cause.87
At the forfeiture hearing, once the Government has shown prob-
able cause for the seizure, the burden of production and persuasion
shifts to the party claiming the property (the claimant)8" to establish
that the property is not subject to forfeiture. 9 The claimant may de-
fend against forfeiture either by vitiating the probable -cause shown
by the Government or by affirmatively demonstrating by a
preponderance of the evidence that the property was not used illegally.,'
Unlike most civil and criminal proceedings, the burden is placed on
the claimant, provided the Government first demonstrates probable
cause for the seizure.9' This placing of the burden on the claimant,
however, has been found constitutional.9 2
The claimant also has very few defenses to the federal forfeiture.
Acquittal or dismissal of charges in any criminal action, for exam-
83. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
84. Id.
85. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634.
86. E.g., U.S. v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz. 450 SEL, 708 F.2d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 1983).
87. Id.
88. See MYzs & BRzosrowsc, supra note 1, at 246. Claimants are persons with a possessory
interest in the property seized. Id.
89. See 19 U.S.C. §1615, incorporated by 21 U.S.C. §881(d); Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d
at 447.
90. Tahuna, 702 F.2d at 1281.
91. See United States v. One Twin Engine Beech Airplane, 533 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir.
1976).
92. See United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 2-Door Hardtop, 529 F.2d 65, 66 (9th
Cir. 1976). The court stated:
Forfeiture statutes are deemed criminal for the purpose, of protecting rights secured
by the 4th and 5th amendments [citations omitted] but they are predominently civil.
*..The Supreme Court has firmly refused to broaden the criminal aspect of forfeitures
so as to encompass a wider range of constitutional protections [citations omitted].
Accordingly, we conclude the challenged forfeiture statutes are not criminal enough
to prevent Congress from imposing the burden of proof on claimant and we uphold
the constitutionality of 21 U.S.C. §881 .
Id.
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ple, is not a defense.93 Innocence9 ' is not a defense unless the claim-
ant can show everything reasonable was done to prevent the illegal
use of the property.95 If, however, the property to be forfeited is
proceeds, the owner's lack of knowledge or consent to the illegal ac-
tivity is a defense. 96 Further defenses exist if the conveyance is a com-
mon carrier97 or is in the unlawful possession of another. 9 With the
exception of these few defenses, a federal forfeiture is very difficult
to defeat. An illustration of the proceeding will be helpful to under-
stand federal forfeiture more fully.
An agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (hereinafter DEA
agent) may suspect that D is dealing in cocaine and arrange for a
meeting with D to "buy" some cocaine. D arrives at the designated
location to discuss the sale, and the DEA agent observes what ap-
pears to be a bag of cocaine under the front passenger seat of D's
car. The observation of the cocaine is enough to create the probable
cause that the car was used to facilitate an illicit drug transaction
and is thus forfeitable. 99 A subsequent chemical analysis establishing
the bagged substance is cocaine will confirm the probable cause;100
however, the DEA agent may seize the vehicle upon the initial obser-
vation, and at that point, begin the forfeiture proceeding, regardless
of whether D is arrested. 1 °0
At the forfeiture hearing, the Government will establish the prob-
able cause that the car is forfeitable. The evidence of the cocaine
in D's car will be enough to show the probable cause." 2 The burden
93. See MYERs & BRzosrows i, supra note 1, at 46-49. Acquittal or dismissal of charges
is not a defense to a federal forfeiture procedure because of the independence of the criminal
and forfeiture actions. Three reasons have been advanced for the independence of the trials.
First, the issues in the two proceedings are different. Civil forfeiture proceedings focus on the
use of the property and not the criminal state of mind of the claimant; criminal proceedings
focus on both, and acquittal or dismissal of the charges may simply be because the government
was unable to prove the requisite intent, without even deciding the question of use. Second,
the burdens of proof in the two proceedings are different, and acquittal or dismissal may be
the result of an inability to meet the "beyond a reasonable doubt" test; this does not necessari-
ly mean the evidence would fall to meet the civil standard. Third, the parties to the two pro-
ceedings are different. In the criminal action the wrongdoer is the defendant, and in the forfeiture
action, the defendant is the property. Id. See also One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring
v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 234 (1972).
94. For purposes of this comment, innocence refers to a person who is innocent of any
wrongdoing and unassociated with any criminal activity.
95. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974).
96. 21 U.S.C. §881(a)(6).
97. Id. §881(a)(4)(A).
98. Id. §881(a)(4)(B).
99. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
100. Id.
101. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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then will shift to D to show either that the car was not used or in-
tended to be used illegally,' 3 or that everything reasonable was done
to prevent the illegal use of the car.' 4 If D is unable to meet that
burden, the car will be forfeited. If the chemical analysis discloses
that the bagged substance is not cocaine, forfeiture will be defeated.
The evidence will have demonstrated that the car was not used il-
legally, and thus, the probable cause for forfeiture will have been
vitiated.'0 5
Federal drug related forfeitures, therefore, are civil in form and
completely independent of any related criminal proceeding. The low
standard of proof allows the Government to prevail more easily in
a forfeiture action. The civil statute, consequently, is an effective means
to curb drug-trafficking. California formerly employed civil forfeiture
procedures in fashion similar to the federal government. As the Califor-
nia drug forfeiture statute now stands, however, the result is quite
different.
B. California Forfeiture Provisions
The first California forfeiture statute, enacted in 1939,106 was em-
bodied in the original Health and Safety Code. ' 7 The original statute'0 '
applied only to vehicles and provided that any vehicle unlawfully used
in connection with narcotics would be forfeited to the state.'0 9 The
clear purpose behind the statute was to curb the flow of narcotics." '0
A forfeiture proceeding under the statute was considered an in rem
action against the property."' Like the federal in rem proceeding,
then, the state action was civil and was subject to the same re-
quirements as those provided in a federal forfeiture. ' 2 Also similar
103. 19 U.S.C. §1615.
104. Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 689.
105. Tahuna, 702 F.2d at 1281.
106. 1939 Cal. Stat. c. 60, §§11610-11629, at 767-69.
107. 1939 Cal. Stat. c. 60, at 482. The purpose of creating the California Health & Safety
Code was to consolidate and revise the law relating to the preservation of the public health
and safety. Id.
108. 1939 Cal. Stat. c. 60, §11610, at 767 (repealed by 1967 Cal. Stat. c. 280, §1, at 1437).
109. Id. Compare CAL. HaATH & SATTY CODE §11610 (which specifically relates to viola-
tions of "narcotics" law) with 21 U.S.C. §881 (which relates more generally to violations of
"controlled substances" law). Although "narcotics" is more specific than "controlled substances,"
the cases interpreting California Health & Safety Code Section 11610 tended to use the terms
interchangeably. See, e.g., People v. One 1964 Chevrolet Corvette Convertible, 274 Cal. App.
2d 721, 723, 79 Cal. Rptr. 447, 448 (1969) (forfeiture of car used for possession of marijuana,
a non-narcotic drug).
110. See One 1964 Chevrolet Corvette, Convertible, 274 Cal. App. 2d at 728, 79 Cal. Rptr.
at 451-52.
111. See People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 286, 231 P.2d 832, 834 (1951).
112. See supra notes 68-92 and accompanying text.
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to the federal forfeiture statute, the first California statute could have
been classified as "quasi-criminal" because, despite the civil nature
of the statute, the purpose was to deter crime."1 3 The civil aspects
of the original statute established that the standard of proof was a
showing of probable cause. The penal aspects, however, invoked cer-
tain rules of evidence normally applicable to criminal actions."t4 These
rules of evidence included the exclusionary rule." '
Defenses to forfeiture under the former California statute also were
similar to those in the federal forfeiture action because only limited
protection was extended to innocent owners. Although the California
statute did not require an owner to do everything reasonable to pre-
vent the illegal use of the property," 6 the innocence of the owner,
with few exceptions," 7 was not a defense." 8 The rationale was that
narcotics traffic was so great a problem that the drastic penalty of
seizure of vehicles used to transport contraband was justified.'' The
public interest of defeating drug related crimes outweighed the loss
suffered by a person whose confidence in others was misplaced. 20
The denial of innocence, in most instances, as a defense in a
forfeiture proceeding was held constitutional by a California Court
of Appeal in People v. One 1961 Ford Falcon. 12' The case involved
the forfeiture of a car because the owner's daughter was found in
the car with a bag of marijuana. The Government and claimant both
conceded that the daughter had permission to use the car, but that
the father did not know of the illegal use. The court, nevertheless,
upheld the forfeiture because of the seriousness of the drug-trafficking
problem.' 22 The court reasoned that if the registered owner relinquishes
control of the vehicle, the relinquishment is generally only to someone
known to the owner and for a relatively short period of time. 23 The
113. See People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, 62 Cal. 2d 92, 96, 396 P.2d 706, 709, 41
Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (1964).
114. See People v. One 1959 Porsche Coupe, 252 Cal. App. 2d 1044, 1046, 60 Cal. Rptr.
816, 818 (1967).
115. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
116. See People v. One 1957 Ford 2-Door, 180 Cal. App. 2d 545, 552, 4 Cal. Rptr. 793,
798 (1960).
117. See 1939 Cal. Stat. c. 60, §11619, at 768 (repealed by 1967 Cal. Stat. c. 280, §1, at 1437).
118. One 1957 Ford 2-Door, 180 Cal. App. 2d at 551, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
119. See id.; One 1964 Chevrolet Corvette Convertible, 272 Cal. App. 2d at 728, 79 Cal.
Rptr. at 451-52.
120. See One 1957 Ford 2-Door, 180 Cal. App. 2d at 552, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 798; One 1964
Chevrolet Corvette Convertible, 274 Cal. App. 2d at 728, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52.
121. 215 Cal. App. 2d 149, 153-54, 30 Cal. Rptr. 110, 112-13 (1963).
122. Id. at 154, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
123. Id.
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owner also has a choice whether to lend the car.' 2 Theoretically, the
registered owner is still in control of the vehicle. The court pointed
out that the owner is punished because the legislature intended to
curb narcotics traffic by penalizing those persons who have control
over the vehicle. 125
Although the owner's innocence of the drug related crime was not
a defense to the civil forfeiture action, lack of consent by the owner
to allow the use of the vehicle was a defense.126 That defense was
similar to the present federal provision which prohibits forfeiture if
the vehicle was unlawfully in the possession of someone other than
the owner at the time of the illegal use.' 27 Thus, the original Califor-
nia forfeiture statute paralleled the federal forfeiture provisions in
many important aspects.
The California forfeiture statute was repealed in 1967128 when the
Legislature concluded that the expense of maintaining the forfeiture
program under the statute was excessive and that the statute had no
deterrent effect.' 29 For reasons unknown, 3 ' the statute was reenacted
in 1972.1' The new statute provides for the forfeiture of property
used in connection with the manufacture or distribution of controlled
substances and incorporates many types of property, including
vehicles.'132
Evidence tends to demonstrate that the new statute is patterned after
the federal provisions. The federal statute was passed only two years
before the California statute. 33 The present California statute uses
language identical to the federal statute in most of the provisions.'34
Forfeitable property under the California statute, for example, is the
same as that enumerated in the federal statute.'35 The federal statute
was amended in 1978 to provide for forfeiture of "moneys, negotiable
instruments, securities, and other things of value," including
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See One 1957 Ford 2-Door, 180 Cal. App. 2d at 550, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 797-98.
127. 21 U.S.C. §881(a)(4)(B).
128. See 1967 Cal. Stat. c. 280, §3, at 1438.
129. Id.
130. Research has been unable to uncover any reason for reenacting the statute. See Review
of Selected 1976 California Legislation, 8 PAc. L.J. 312, 314 [hereinafter cited as Review of
1976 Legislation].
131. 1972 Cal. Stat. c. 1407, §1, at 3025.
132. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11470. Unlike the prior California forfeiture statute,
the present statute relates to violations of "controlled substances" law, not to violations of
"narcotics" law. Id; see supra note 109.
133. 21 U.S.C. §881 (1970).
134. Compare 21 U.S.C. §881 with CAL. HEALTH & SAEr CODE §11470.
135. Compare 21 U.S.C. §881 with CAL. HEALTH & SAFaTY CODE §11470.
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proceeds.'36 The California statute was amended similarly in 1982.'",
Based on the evolution of the two statutes, the reasonable inference
arises that the California forfeiture law has been patterned on the
federal counterpart.
Despite the similarities of the present California and federal statutes,
they are different in several significant ways. First, California requires
the owner or user of the property to be convicted of the drug offense
before the state can prevail in the forfeiture action.' 38 As a conse-
quence, a California forfeiture is more difficult to sustain than a federal
forfeiture. The California forfeiture procedure begins with a seizure
of the property.' 39 Although probable cause is enough for the seizure,' 40
at the forfeiture hearing the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the property was connected to criminal activity." ' This
burden is met only after obtaining the conviction of the owner or
user.' 42
The second way in which the California statute differs from the
federal statute is in extending greater protection to the innocent prop-
erty owner.'4 3 California requires that the owner have actual knowledge
of the illegal use before the property will be forfeited. At the forfeiture
hearing the state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the owner consented to the use of the property with
knowledge that the property would be used illegally.'" This burden
of proving knowledge is independent of the conviction requirement. 45
The conviction of the user first must be obtained in a criminal trial.
In the subsequent forfeiture action, the state must introduce evidence
of the conviction and prove that the owner had actual knowledge
of the illegal use.'46 This protection extended to innocent owners dif-
fers from the federal procedure. Under the federal law, the Govern-
ment does not have to prove actual knowledge unless the property
to be forfeited is proceeds.' 4 7 Additionally, under the federal statute,
the burden is on the innocent owner to prove that everything reasonable
136. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-1193, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADrnm. NEws 9496, 9522.
137. See 1982 Cal. Stat. c. 1289, §1, at -.
138. CAL. HEATH & SAY CODE §11470.
139. Id. §11471.
140. Id.
141. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text; CAL. HEALTH & SaFETY CODE §11491.7.
142. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11473.
143. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11488.5(e).
144. Id. §11488.5(d)(1).
145. Id. §11488.5(d)(2).
146. Id. §§11488.5(d)(2), 11488.5(e).
147. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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was done to prevent the illegal use of the property.' 8 As will be
discussed more fully below,'4 9 the California approach is more equitable
because the innocent owner will not suffer the consequences of another
person's criminal conduct.
The third difference between the California and federal statutes con-
cerns the forfeiture of vehicles. Under the federal statute, a vehicle
may be forfeited if used to facilitate the possession of even a minute
amount of any controlled substance. 50 The California statute was
amended in 1982 to make vehicles forfeitable if used to facilitate the
possession for sale of specific amounts of specific controlled
substances.' 5' The California statute also prohibits forfeiture of a vehi-
cle if a person other than the defendant has a community property
interest in the vehicle and the vehicle is the only one available to
the defendant's immediate family. 52 Under the California statute, then,
forfeiture of a vehicle is more difficult than under the federal statute.
Based on the previous illustration,5 3 under the California provi-
sions the DEA agent would be able to seize the car upon the initial
observation of the cocaine. If the bag contains the requisite statutory
amount of cocaine,'15 the observation is enough probable cause for
the seizure. D will have to be convicted in a criminal trial, however,
before the state can sustain the standard of proof in the forfeiture
action. The California forfeiture action, then, necessarily is depen-
dent upon the outcome of the criminal trial.
This dependency of the forfeiture action upon the criminal trial
creates a practical problem. The various steps involved in California
criminal procedure may cause the criminal trial to last for a year or
longer. In the meantime, the property is being held in storage,
deteriorating and costing the state a considerable amount of money.
Under federal law, the criminal and forfeiture actions are completely
independent.'55 In the federal action, the car may be forfeited even
if no criminal charges are brought against D; therefore, the federal
government incurs no undue costs.
A successful forfeiture judgment in California is more difficult to
148. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
150. Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 693.
151. 1982 Cal. Stat. c. 1280, §1, at - (amending CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11470);
CAL. HEALTH & SArY CODE §11470(g).
152. 1982 Cal. Stat. c. 1280, §1, at - (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11470);
CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11470(g).
153. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
154. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFTY CODE §11470(g).
155. See supra notes 48, 93 and accompanying text.
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obtain because the criminal standard is more difficult to meet than
is the civil standard. The federal government is required to show only
probable cause at the forfeiture hearing. The claimant then has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the lack of
probable cause or that everything reasonable was done to prevent the
illegal use. Under California law, the state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the property was used illegally and that the
owner knew of the illegal use. The burden on the state clearly is more
difficult than the burden on the federal government.
The requirement of a conviction is in direct contravention of the
historical purpose of forfeitures,',56 including the purpose of the prior
California statute.'57 The state must meet a difficult standard to prevail.
The forfeiture action, thus, is not as effective in curbing crime. This
conviction requirement must be reexamined in light of the history and
purpose of forfeiture statutes. The California Legislature should amend
the forfeiture statute by eliminating the requirement of a conviction,
to create a civil forfeiture statute. With a lower standard of proof,
forfeitures will be obtained more easily, thereby promoting the pur-
pose of a forfeiture action.
REDUCING THE STANDARD OF PROOF
As previously discussed, a successful forfeiture in California is more
difficult to obtain than a federal forfeiture because California requires
the state to meet a higher standard of proof. Although state and federal
law are independent, the California drug forfeiture law is patterned
on the federal counterpart.' s Unlike federal forfeitures, though, the
California law is an ineffective means for curbing the flow of con-
trolled substances."5 9 The California Legislature can remedy this prob-
lem by reducing the standard of proof. Two reasons for lowering
the standard will be discussed. First, the California statute does not
satisfy the purpose for which the statute was enacted. Second, the
statute is inconsistent with the history of forfeitures generally and
with the tendency of the California Legislature to pattern state
forfeiture provisions on federal precedent. If the standard of proof
is lowered to that prevailing in a civil action, the statute will be a
156. See supra notes 23-44 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 113-26 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
159. Under the California statute, the state bears a more difficult burden. Forfeitures are
not easily sustained. The statute thus is not effective in curbing drug-trafficking. See supra
notes 137-49 and accompanying text.
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powerful weapon to attack drug-trafficking. As the statute presently
stands, this purpose is not being fulfilled.
A. The Purpose of the California Statute
The purpose of the original California drug related forfeiture statute
was to curb narcotics flow. 60 The purpose of the present statute is
to deter trafficking of controlled substances.' Under the present
statute, however, that purpose is not being achieved because forfeitures
are difficult for the state to sustain.' 62 A proceeding that will ac-
complish the statutory purpose, ease the burden on the state, yet com-
port with notions of equity and fairness, is both desirable and
necessary. The statutory purpose can be achieved without compromising
the critical notions of equity and fairness if the standard of proof
is lowered.
Although the present California statute evidences no express
purpose, 163 the language of the statute is substantially similar to that
of the former state statute and to the present federal statute. By parity
of reasoning, although the present state statute has a higher standard
of proof, the purpose of the statute is the same as the purpose of
the former and federal statutes.' 64 In further support of this reason-
ing, when the prior state statute was repealed, the Legislature did
not express an intent to alter the underlying purpose of curbing drug
traffic.'65 The Legislature stated that the statute was repealed because
the law was ineffective as a deterrent. 66 The logical inference arises
that the lawmakers wanted a statute that would be more effective
in curbing the flow of drugs. The statute -was reenacted with a higher
standard of proof, however, which creates an even less effective deter-
rent because the state cannot sustain the forfeiture of illegally used
property or illegal profits as easily as in a civil action. A lower stan-
dard of proof would fulfill the purpose of forfeitures by depriving
criminals of property used and profits gained illegally. 67
By reducing the standard of proof, California can still maintain
160. See One 1964 Chevrolet Corvette Convertible, 274 Cal. App. 2d at 728, 79 Cal. Rptr.
at 451-52.
161. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text; see also supra note 109.
162. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
164. See Los Angeles Met-Transit v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainment, 54 Cal. 2d 684,
688-89, 355 P.2d 905, 907, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1960).
165. 1967 Cal. Stat. c. 280, §3, at 1438 (repealing 1939 Cal. Stat c. 60, §11610, at 767).
166. Id.; see also Review of 1976 Legislation, supra note 130, at 314.
167. The forfeiture will provide revenue to the people because the seized items go to law
enforcement agencies and money will go into the state treasury.
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the interest in protecting innocent claimants. Under the federal statute,
a forfeiture is very difficult to defeat, even if the claimant is inno-
cent of any wrongdoing. The landmark case of Calero-Toledo v. Pear-
son Yacht Leasing Co."8 held that the innocence of the claimant was
no defense unless the claimant did everything reasonable to prevent
the illegal use of the property. 69 The ruling imposes an affirmative
duty upon the claimant to ensure against an illegal use of the
property. 7 '
Although the duty to prevent illegal use of property is consistent
with the history of forfeitures, a departure that protects innocent
owners is justifiable. Forfeitures are designed to remove the instrumen-
talities of illegal activities from criminals to prevent the continuation
of the crime.' 7' Deprivation of an innocent claimant's property does
not comport with the purpose of deterrence because the innocent owner
does not need to be deterred from criminal activity. By depriving the
innocent claimant of property for fear of a continuation of the crime,
the federal government creates a grave inequity. If, however, the in-
nocent claimant is protected, the purpose of deterrence will not be
hampered because the innocent owner has done nothing criminal from
which to be deterred.
The California Legislature avoided the problem by enacting a statute
providing that if the claimant did not have actual knowledge that
the property would be used, or was used, for an illegal purpose,
forfeiture is prohibited. 172 Under this provision, an innocent claimant
will not suffer a forfeiture because of another person's wrongdoing.
A reduction in the standard of proof need not affect this provision.
The state can still be required to prove by a showing of probable
cause, consistent with the lower standard of proof, that the claimant
had actual knowledge of the illegal activity.
Another way California protects claimants is through the provi-
sions allowing forfeiture of vehicles. The statute requires that the vehi-
cle must have been used to facilitate the possession for sale of specific
amounts of controlled substances.' The requisite amounts are quite
large; ' therefore, unless the claimant is dealing in drugs extensively,
forfeiture of a vehicle is unlikely to occur. Furthermore, even if the
168. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
169. Id. at 689.
170. See id.
171. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
172. CAL. HEALTH & SAFEY CODE §11488.5(e).
173. Id. §11470(g).
174. Id.
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vehicle were used to facilitate the possession of the requisite amount
of a controlled substance, forfeiture still may not occur. If a person
other than the defendant has a community property interest in the
vehicle or the vehicle is the only one available to the defendant's im-
mediate family,17 5 the forfeiture will not be sustained. These provi-
sions do not have to be altered by a reduction in the standard of proof.
Finally, California can protect the rights of claimants, innocent or
guilty, without requiring a conviction prior to forfeiture through the
exclusionary rule. The penal aspects of a civil forfeiture statute allow
application of the exclusionary rule to the action.176 All evidence ob-
tained in violation of the individual's fourth amendment rights is in-
admissible to establish the lower probable cause requirement.'17  The
exclusionary rule, then, serves to protect the individual at the forfeiture
hearing. A reduction in the standard of proof will not affect this
protection. The federal civil forfeiture scheme provides for the use
of the exclusionary rule, and no reason exists to eliminate that pro-
tection simply because California reduces the standard of proof.
The California forfeiture statute was designed to curb drug-
trafficking. The high standard of proof makes successful forfeiture
actions very difficult, and as a result, the statute does not serve the
legislative purpose. By reducing the standard of proof to a probable
cause standard, the state goal of protecting the individual will not
be hampered. The probable cause standard also will realign the Califor-
nia statute with the history of forfeitures.
B. The California Approach is Inconsistent with the
History of Forfeitures
Forfeiture has a deeply rooted history as a civil in rem proceeding.'7 8
The focus historically has been on the use of the property, rather
than on the motive of the individual.7 9 Although presently in per-
sonam forfeitures exist, the first criminal forfeiture statutes in the
United States were not enacted until 1970.'8 The historical strength,
therefore, lies in favor of civil forfeiture.
Consistent with this historical development, as noted above, Califor-
nia initially enacted a civil forfeiture statute.' 8 ' For reasons unknown,
175. Id.
176. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d at 448.
177. Id.
178. See supra notes 23-50 and accompanying text.
179. Id.
180. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
181. 1939 Cal. Stat. c. 60, §11610, at 767 (repealed 1967 Cal. Stat. c. 280, §1, at 1437).
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the statute was replaced with a criminal statute."8 2 The focus of the
new statute is on the individual. This change of focus affects the
underlying purpose by making forfeiture a form of, punishment.'83
The result is that the statute is divorced from the history and prece-
dent of forfeitures. By reenacting a civil in rem statute, California
again will have a forfeiture law consistent with the history of
forfeitures. The civil statute also will be consistent with the history
of patterning the state forfeiture provisions on the federal law.
California clearly has evidenced a tendency to pattern the state
forfeiture laws on federal forfeiture provisions."" The language and
history of the present California statute is substantially similar to that
of the federal statute. The California requirement that a conviction
be obtained against the user prior to the forfeiture hearing, however,
is inconsistent with this patterning. If the standard of proof is lowered,
the traditional patterning after the federal model will continue.
At first glance, the theory that California is following the federal
government could support the present California in personam statute.
Congress enacted two federal criminal forfeiture statutes for the first
time in 1970,185 the same year the civil statute, 21 U.S.C. section 881,
was passed, and only two years prior to the reenactment of the Califor-
nia statute.'816 The congressional enactment could be viewed as an en-
dorsement of criminal forfeiture statutes after almost 200 years of
prohibition. The California Legislature perhaps enacted the present
statute with the intent to support federal recognition and creation of
criminal forfeitures. This hypothesis is not viable, however, to sup-
port the replacement of the former civil forfeiture procedure with a
criminal forfeiture proceeding.
First, the federal criminal statutes that require a conviction involve
a pattern of crime,' 87 and are not directed toward single criminal acts.
The federal government has maintained the statute providing for in
rem forfeiture of property connected to individual criminal acts.'
If the federal criminal forfeiture statutes were models for the present
California drug related forfeiture statute, a logical conclusion would
be that the California statute would require a pattern of crime. That
182. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
183. See MYERS & BRZOSTOWSKI, supra note 1, at 9, 301.
184. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
185. RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§1962-1968; 21 U.S.C. §848.
186. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11470.
187. See RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§1961-1968; 21 U.S.C. §848; see also MYERS & BRZOSTOWSK1,
supra note 1, at 302-41, for a full discussion of the federal criminal forfeiture statutes.
188. 21 U.S.C. §881.
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requirement does not exist under this California statute. The federal
criminal statutes, then, cannot be seen as precedent for a criminal
forfeiture statute unrelated to a pattern of criminal activity.
In 1982 the California Legislature addressed the problem of a pat-
tern of crime with the enactment of Penal Code section 186.1. This
statute is patterned directly on the federal criminal statutes. 8 9 The
purpose of Penal Code section 186.1 is to punish and deter organized
criminal activities through forfeiture of profits acquired as a result
of the activities.' 9 California, therefore, has a very specific criminal
forfeiture statute modeled after the federal criminal forfeiture statutes.
The California drug related forfeiture"9 need not remain a criminal
procedure.
Federal law contains both civil and criminal forfeitures. By reduc-
ing the standard of proof, California will make the present drug related
forfeiture statute the equivalent of the federal statute, and hence create
a civil forfeiture action. California also will have a criminal statute
patterned on the federal criminal forfeiture statutes.' 92 California civil
and criminal forfeiture statutes then will coexist. The result will be
that California will have a civil forfeiture statute that is an effective
tool for deterrence, and that is consistent with history and precedent.
CONCLUSION
Forfeiture actions are used frequently to attack the particular vice
of the era. Modernly, forfeitures are used to curb the flow of con-
trolled substances. This purpose and use have firm roots in the history
of forfeitures. Both the federal government and California adopted
civil in rem proceedings to deter drug-trafficking. With the advent
of the 1970s, criminal forfeitures became a part of American law.
California repealed the civil forfeiture statute and subsequently adopted
a criminal forfeiture statute. This present statute has changed the focus
of forfeitures from the use of the property to the conduct and intent
of the claimant.
Arguments have been advanced to support the contention that the
present California forfeiture statute is ineffective as a deterrent to
drug-trafficking because the criminal standard of proof is very dif-
ficult to meet. Thus, the state is unlikely to prevail in a forfeiture
action. California could deter drug-trafficking effectively if the criminal
189. Compare RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§1961-1968 with CAL. PENAL CODE §186.1.
190. See CAL. PENAL CODE §186.1.
191. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11470.
192. CAL. PENAL CODE §186.1.
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is not only incarcerated, but also deprived of illegal assets. A criminal
will not be in the financial position to start trafficking drugs again
after serving a jail sentence if the illegal assets are forfeited. Even
if the user of the property is not convicted, forfeiture of illegal assets
and property used illegally will prevent the continuance of the criminal
activity.
Deterrence can be accomplished if the forfeiture statute is amended
to reduce the standard of proof to the federal civil standard, which
has been held constitutional. The history of forfeiture statutes indicates
that the California forfeiture provisions have been patterned after the
federal laws, evidencing a desire to conform to the federal approach.
The result of amending the California statute to conform with the
federal law would be an effective, civil drug forfeiture statute. This
comment also has shown that California should retain the more
equitable approach in affording greater protection to the innocent prop-
erty owner. By amending the forfeiture statute to create a civil ac-
tion, then, California will produce an effective, yet equitable means
to deter drug-trafficking, consistent with the history and purpose of
forfeitures.
Eileen M. Diepenbrock
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